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Introduction
Agriculture  constitutes  one  of  the  main  sectors  in  the 
economies  of  Central  Asia:  cotton  production  and  export, 
mainly  in  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan,  and  to  a  lesser 
extent in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan; a booming grain sector 
in  Kazakhstan;  and  a  long  tradition  of  vegetable  cultivation 
throughout the region. The agrarian question is a sensitive one 
since the population is still predominantly rural in four of the five 
republics (all except Kazakhstan) and because food safety is not 
ensured in the two poorest states (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). 
Land reform would be a priority for the growth of investment, 
increased  productivity,  and,  consequently,  the  reduction  of 
rural  unemployment  and  poverty.  However,  pressed  by  the 
choice of cotton versus self-sufficiency in food production, the 
Central Asian states remain hesitant. They must also manage 
many structural problems, including high levels of corruption 
in the agrarian administrative organs, the opacity of decision-
making structures for the export of production, quasi-slavery 
in some impoverished rural areas, child labour, and serious 
environmental problems related to the overuse of the soil.
The European Union is a minor agricultural customer for the 
states  of  Central  Asia.  A  majority  of  Central  Asian  exports 
stay in the post-Soviet market: Kazakh grain is sold mainly to 
neighbouring countries and some Middle Eastern states, and 
Uzbek cotton production goes mainly to Russia. Even though 
trade  has  increased  with  Kazakhstan,  it  still  only  ranks  73rd 
among exporters of agricultural products to the EU. Central 
Asian cotton faces competition from several countries—such as 
the United States, India, and Pakistan—that produce more than 
they consume.1 Finally, as in other economic sectors, conditions 
in  Central  Asia  discourage  the  implementation  of  many 
European companies. Some of them nonetheless continue to 
buy cotton fiber from Central Asia, including Paul Reinhart AG 
(Switzerland), Cargill Cotton (UK) and Geocoton (France).
Table 1. EU-Central Asia agricultural exchanges in 2007
Agricultural 
exports to the EU 
(€ millions)
Agricultural imports 
from the EU  € 
millions)
Total exports and 
Imports   
(€ millions)
Kazakhstan 157 190 347
Kyrgyzstan 10 6 16
Uzbekistan 59 51 110
Tajikistan 30 17 47
Turkmenistan 7 9 16
Source: Table compiled on the basis of official figures available for each country 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm>.
Although Central Asia is a modest partner in terms of agricultural 
trade and relatively few European companies are based in the 
sector, the agrarian issue is of importance for the EU. In the 
face  of  massive  corruption,  what  cooperative  development 
should  be  proposed  in  agriculture?  When  it  is  harvested 
under unacceptable conditions, what position should be taken 
towards cotton production? Should there be no collaboration 
over agriculture, while this sector is essential for the survival of 
many of these republics? How should land reform be supported 
such  that  the  rural  population  receives  the  benefits?  After 
a brief assessment on the current agrarian situation and the 
land reforms that have taken place in the 1990-2000 period, 
this paper will consider the cotton versus food security issue, 
and then the political and economic issues the Central Asian 
land sector has to face, in order to propose recommendations 
to the EU.
1. The Central Asian Agricultural Sector: 
Figures, Reforms, and Paradoxes
The Agrarian Question by State
The  five  Central  Asian  states  form  a  vast  agricultural  area 
of 306 million hectares.2 By virtue of its size, Kazakhstan is a 
special  case.  According  to  official  figures  from  the  Ministry 
of Agriculture, the country now has 222 million hectares of 
farmland, a majority of which (189 million or 85%) is being 
used as pasture and 24 million (10%) as cultivated land. Nearly 
two-thirds of the latter is devoted to cereals and one-third to 
fodder crops.3 Due to booms in oil and gas, Kazakhstan has seen 
agriculture fall rapidly into the background in terms of its share 
of revenues. Thus, while the primary sector made up almost 
13% of the national GDP in 1995, in little more than a decade, 
it represented just 6.7% in 2006, and 5.8% in 2008. The sector 
remains small compared to the importance of industry (39% 
of GDP) and the tertiary sector (54%).4 In terms of exports, the 
trend is similar. In 1988, agriculture accounted for 17% of the 
exports of the republic, but only 6% in 2000, while for the same 
period, oil jumped from 10 to 50% and metal from 19 to 32%.5 
However,  Kazakhstan  remains  a  major  exporter  of  grains—
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and to a lesser extent, of fruits and vegetables, intended in 
particular for Russia and other CIS markets—but a secondary 
exporter of cotton. Kazakhstan seeks to become one of the 
major breadbaskets of the world and to increase its export 
capacity. In 2004, grain production was only 9 million tonnes, 
but it reached 19 million in 2007,6 up 22% over 2006. Figures 
for 2008 have decreased slightly, to 17 million tonnes. While in 
2006, Kazakhstan was the fourteenth largest exporter of grain 
in the world, it now ranks sixth and hopes to become the fifth 
by the end of the decade. In 2008 the country exported nearly 
6  million  tonnes  of  wheat.  However,  its  main  customers—
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran—are rather poor 
and  often  insolvent  countries.  Hence,  the  importance  for 
Astana to put in place European standards for grain products 
certification in order to target more efficient markets where 
payment is guaranteed.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan form a second category. In both 
countries, agriculture consists mainly of cotton and much of the 
population still works in this sector. Despite the many challenges 
it faces, Uzbekistan is undoubtedly the main agricultural power 
in Central Asia, even with just 43,000 km2 of irrigated land.7 The 
country produces mainly cotton, but also fruits, vegetables, 
cereals, and rice in the west, in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, 
as well as livestock. These products are intended primarily for 
domestic consumption, although some are also exported to 
neighboring countries. According to EU figures, the share of 
agriculture in the GDP of Uzbekistan fell from 32% in 1995, to 
24% in 2007,8 but the sector still employs 44% of 15 million 
people active in the national workforce.
In Turkmenistan, agriculture is also a leading sector in terms 
of economic activity. It employs nearly half the population, 
but its share in GDP is even more modest than in Uzbekistan, 
at only 10% against 38% for industry and 50% for the tertiary 
sector.9 Only 5% of the surface area of the country is arable, 
about 1.6 million hectares, of which 28,000 km2 is irrigated. 
The remaining 95%, mostly desert, is used for grazing livestock 
or is undeveloped. The country produces mainly cotton, grain, 
and  livestock.  Since  independence, the  authorities  have set 
goals  of  grain  self-sufficiency,  but  the  results  have  hardly 
been conclusive. Between 1991 and 1996, the amount of land 
cultivated increased by 420,000 hectares, mobilising the few 
available machines to the detriment of the development of the 
irrigation system. The area covered by wheat multiplied by four, 
from 200,000 hectares in 1990, to 800,000 in 2001-2002.10 This 
growth was achieved in part at the expense of fodder crops for 
animal feed (not without consequences for livestock), cotton 
and vegetables.
Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan  have  a  much  smaller  agricultural 
potential  due  to  the  high  altitude  of  the  majority  of  their 
territory. However, this sector is one of the few where they 
have export potential, as well as a vital area for food security.
In  Tajikistan,  only  21%  of  the  territory  is  considered  arable 
and  there  is  only  7,220  km2  of  irrigated  land.11  Agriculture 
notwithstanding accounts for 30% of the country’s GDP and 
employs more than two-thirds (67%) of its workforce.12 The 
agricultural sector has been particularly hard hit by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the civil war in the first half of the 1990s. 
But during the first half of the 2000s, it largely returned to the 
levels in saw verifier during the last Soviet years.13 Tajikistan 
produces mostly wheat (36%), cotton (30%), and other cereals 
(9%).14  Cotton  is  grown  on  about  40%  of  the  arable  land; 
more than half the output comes from the southern region of 
Khatlon and one-third from the northern province of Sogd.15 
With rapid population growth, lack of urban or industrial work 
opportunities,  and  increasing  food  insecurity,  the  pressure 
on the land has increased since independence. At the same 
time, paradoxically, the mass migration of people of working 
age people has emptied the country and hindered agricultural 
development: working in the fields is now often left to women, 
children and the elderly.
In Kyrgyzstan, the situation is similar. Agriculture constitutes 
32% of the GDP, while industry accounts for 18% and services 
for 49%.16 Of about 2.7 million people active in the workforce, 
nearly half (48%) worked in the agricultural sector, against only 
12% in industry and close to 40% in the tertiary sector.17 Given 
the very high overall levels of unemployment and poverty in the 
country, the agricultural sector is a vital source of income for 
the population. Kyrgyzstan has become the largest agricultural 
producer in terms of percentage of GDP, but it has the smallest 
amount of arable land.18 The area of irrigated land is limited 
to 10,700 km2. In agricultural terms, regional disparities are 
extremely high. The north has 887,000 hectares of arable land, 
used mainly for growing wheat, but the south has less than 
half that area, only 415,000 hectares, for more than half of the 
population. The ratio of land per person is 0.19 hectares in the 
south, compared to 0.53 hectare in the north.19
The agricultural capacity of Central Asian states remains modest. 
Uzbekistan, the most agricultural country of the region, has no 
more than 10% arable land on its territory, while Kazakhstan 
has 8%, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan about 6.5%, and Turkmenistan 
less than 5%.20 These lands were made fertile primarily through 
irrigation systems built by humans, although sometimes from 
surface waters as rivers. Across the region, with the exception 
of Kazakhstan, the pressure on land is much stronger since birth 
rates remain high in the countryside, where more than half the 
population of the four southern republics lives.21 In Turkmenistan 
like  Uzbekistan,  a  process  of  ruralisation  set  in  during  the 
1990s (already visible since the 1970s) as a consequence of 
the difficulties of urban life without work opportunities. Many 
people preferred to return and resettled in their home villages 
to work individual plots. The rural populations therefore suffer 
from very high unemployment rates given the scarcity of land. 
Marked  in  its  entirety  by  low  population  density,22  Central 
Asia is experiencing severe overcrowding in agrarian areas. In 6  EUCAM Working Paper No. 6
Turkmenistan, there is at best just 0.5 hectare of arable land 
per person, compared to an average of 2.3 hectares for the rest 
of the former Soviet Union.23 The most difficult situation is in 
the Fergana Valley, where more than 10 million inhabitants, or 
nearly 20% of all the entire population in Central Asia, live. Near 
Andijan, population density reaches 559 persons per km2.24
The Mixed Results of Land Reforms
While  some  governments  have  been  more  proactive  than 
others in terms of land reform, it is far from being final and 
still faces many obstacles, even in the two states with more 
liberalised economies, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Privatisation 
of land comes with serious misgivings among Central Asian 
elites, all trained according to the Soviet model and attached to 
the principle of land as state property, and also concerned with 
social stability. Governments have indeed sought to ensure that 
privatisation does not lead to ethnic conflicts, as was the case in 
1990 in Osh, where access to land in part triggered confrontation 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. In Uzbekistan in particular, fear 
that privatisation will lead to massive unemployment paralyzes 
any reform; no non-agricultural compensatory economy seems 
to be developed in rural areas. Moreover, land is a substantial 
financial resource and an object of desire. The best lands have 
generally been awarded to the former party elite or former 
directors of collective farms. Finally, the farmers themselves 
often  express  reluctance  towards  privatisation.  Rural  areas 
have suffered the brunt of the declining state involvement in 
social benefits to collective and state farms (food, social and 
health  services,  transportation  infrastructure,  and  collective 
management  of  expensive  equipment  and  inputs),  and  are 
sometimes reluctant to let go of the last collective structures, 
which are symbols of some minimal assistance.
Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region that has resolutely 
embarked on the conversion of large Soviet farms, guaranteeing 
the right to private property and creating the legal conditions 
for an open land market. In Kazakhstan, reforms were initiated 
quite early but were more limited than in Kyrgyzstan. Despite 
99-year  leases  granted  to  private  operators,  the  ownership 
of  land  remains  the  responsibility  of  the  state.  The  main 
problem of Kazakh agriculture remains the lack of investment 
necessary for performance growth and quality improvement. 
The  conditions  of  storage,  processing  and  packaging  often 
render local food uncompetitive with imports; a large part of 
the fruits and vegetable production is damaged or over-priced 
even before it reaches store shelves. The farms are still very 
large, a legacy of the Soviet system, and largely managed as 
collectives. Few farms are cultivated on an individual basis: 
In 2005, these latter cultivate less than 147,000 hectares on 
222 million hectares,25 located mainly in the south and used to 
grow cotton. The continental climate of the country forces to 
extensive farming with low yields. Thus, the record in 2007, 1.3 
tonnes of grain per hectare, is less than half that of Canada (2.7 
tonnes of grain per hectare).26 But due to its dry climate, the 
country can combine several varieties of wheat and durum.
In Uzbekistan, the agricultural sector remains largely in state 
hands,  despite  the  many  reform  plans.  Even  today,  nobody 
owns the land they operate. In 1993, collective farms were 
replaced by cooperatives (shirkat) that only slightly changed the 
operating modes of the Soviet regime. The shirkat represent 
60%  of  production  but  are  largely  deficient.  According  to 
International Crisis Group (ICG), in 2003, 45% of shirkat made 
no profit because of their low yields: less than one tonne of 
cotton per year per hectare in Karakalpakstan and a tonne and 
a half in Djizzak.27 Theoretically, in 2008, 60% of shirkat should 
have been transformed into private farms. To this end, families 
are  expected  to  sign  a  contract  with  administrators,  who 
provide inputs and purchase production. Autonomy remains 
extremely  limited.  The  so-called  private  operators  cannot 
choose their crops and many are forced to cultivate almost 
exclusively  cotton  or  wheat.  According  to  the  ICG,  farmers 
who have refused to follow directives have had their water 
cut off or their land confiscated. The state may also repossess 
the land, often under opaque conditions, usually as sanction 
for poor performance. In practice, the confiscation of land is 
part of a system of pervasive corruption, with poor harvests 
used as a pretext for the confiscation of the best land, which 
is then redistributed to members of the elite. Whatever the 
status of land use, the selling price of products is fixed by the 
authorities,  usually  at  about  one-third  of  the  market  price; 
only the surplus can be sold at maximum price. Private farmers 
(dehqon) have only small farms (0.2 hectares), with leases for 
periods of 10 to 50 years.28 Despite their small size, these farms 
are more efficient than large ones. They represent only 10% of 
the agricultural land in Uzbekistan, but produce about 40% of 
its agriculture. In 2003, over 90% of meat, dairy and potatoes 
came from private farms.29
In Tajikistan, despite announced reforms, little has changed and 
land remains state property. Individuals may obtain an inheritable 
right to work an area over their lifetime, but it cannot be sold 
or purchased. The state also reserves the option to withdraw 
operators it deems ineffective. Since 2002, a law authorises the 
establishment of nominally independent entities over which 
the operator can choose his crop. In practice, collective farms 
have simply been re-registered as collective dehqon. According 
to the ICG, farmers working for deqhon are still employees, not 
shareholders. In 2005, the government officially privatised the 
last 200 large state farms, but these procedures were widely 
rigged and half of the applications were refused. A common 
practice is to force farmers wishing to leave their cooperative 
commitment  to  devote  70%  of  their  land  to  cotton,  which 
hampers autonomy. Finally, even when they were allowed to 
start a private operation, many deqhon operators who refused 
to cultivate what they had been requested to grow have seen 
their crops destroyed by bulldozers. As in Uzbekistan, smaller 
farms appear to be more efficient. Independent deqhon with 
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generally  30%  higher  than  collective  farms  (24%  more  for 
wheat).30 
In Turkmenistan, the system has changed much less. It has 
always been based on respect for the annual state plan. The 
‘peasant associations’ were instructed to distribute by lease 
90% of the arable land (1.5 million hectares) to the total rural 
population.  These  350,000  families  do  not  own  their  land, 
but have the right and duty to work it. Cooperatives serve 
as  essential  intermediaries  between  the  state  and  farmers, 
and  maintain  minimal  community  infrastructure  in  villages. 
However, control remains the domain of the state. Farmers are 
obliged to complete the harvest, for which planned objectives 
increase from year to year and the output is bought by the 
state  at  prices  well  below  international  rates.31  While  the 
state remains in control of the selling prices, Turkmen farmers 
are  supposed  to  be  independent  in  supplying  their  inputs. 
As during Soviet times, land plots total only a small surface 
compared to cooperative farms (0.25 hectares compared to 4 
hectares allocated to the tenant for growing wheat and cotton), 
but guarantee a significant portion of its revenues.32 Operators 
generally have a lease for a period of five to ten years, but 
production targets are reviewed annually and the lease is not 
transferable. The state reserves the right to reclaim the land if 
the farmer, his family or employees fail to meet the required 
quota. This action had hardly been applied in the 1990s, but 
in recent years the increasingly difficult agricultural situation 
in the country has led the authorities to confiscate the land of 
about 2,000 out of 7,000 private farmers.33
The rural population of Central Asia faces very different realities 
depending  upon  the  country  in  question.  In  Kazakhstan, 
government policies now focus on the modernisation of large 
farms,  the  profitability  of  extensive  farming  and  improving 
distribution and quality. In Kyrgyzstan, the primary challenge is 
to avoid the aggravation of social tensions linked to landlessness 
and  recurrent  poverty  in  mountainous  areas,  and  to  help 
farmers find their niche in a largely privatised and deregulated 
market. In the other three states, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
and Tajikistan, many elements of the Soviet agricultural system 
were maintained. Individual plots or small family farms offer 
far greater profitability than collective work since they operate 
at the discretion of its operator, whose adaptability to the local 
market is greater. As in Soviet times, the productivity of Central 
Asian agriculture within larger collective structures inherited 
from kolkhoz and state farms is particularly low.34
The Central Asian Dilemma: Cotton or food self-
sufficiency?
Strategic choices regarding production face all states in the 
region. Developed since the Tsarist regime, cotton cultivation 
picked up after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. In Central 
Asia, the area devoted to cotton increased from 441,000 hectares 
in 1914, to more than one million in 1940.35 The monopoly of 
cotton over the land accelerated after the completion of major 
irrigation works such as the Fergana Canal in the 1930s, the 
canal of the Hunger Steppe between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
and the Karakum Canal in the 1950s, which diverts the waters 
of the Amu-Darya to the deserts of Turkmenistan. The surfaces 
covered by cotton continued to increase, reaching 1.4 million 
hectares in 1960, 1.7 million in 1970, and 2 million in the early 
1980s. However, cotton production declined considerably in 
the 1990s due to the financial difficulties of the new states, lack 
of inputs and land degradation. Thus, in 1998, output barely 
reached 46% of its 1980 level, and in 2004 only 56%.
Cotton  constitutes  one  of  the  major  means  for  the  Central 
Asian states to gain foreign currency, especially Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan.  Although  maintaining  this  monoculture  obviously 
allows  elites  to  guarantee  huge  financial  benefits,  it  also 
fits into a macroeconomic strategy to fund the large public 
enterprises in the industrial sector, largely in deficit. Over two-
thirds of Central Asian cotton production is exported and the 
region accounts for 15% of world exports. However, significant 
variance  exists  between  countries.  Although  Kazakhstan  is 
Table 2. Cotton production in Central Asia (thousands of tonnes) and as a share of global 
production
1913 1940 1970 1980 1990 1994 1998 2000 2002 2004
Kazakhstan 11 72 91 118 102 70 55 85 105 148
Kyrgyzstan 9 31 62 68 25 18 27 27 25 40
Uzbekistan 171 457 1483 2061 1593 1248 1000 975 1033 1125
Tajikistan 11 57 240 334 256 168 110 106 165 172
Turkmenistan 23 70 287 415 437 314 197 187 148 203
Total Central Asia 225 687 2163 2996 2413 1818 1389 1380 1476 1688
World production 6296 6934 11740 13831 18970 18762 18713 19437 19437 26193
% of world 
production
3.5 % 10 % 18.5 % 21.5 % 13 % 9.5 % 7.5 % 7 % 7.5 % 6.5 %
Source: J. Baffes, “Cotton-Dependent Countries in the Global Context”, in D. Kandiyoti (ed.), The Cotton 
Sector in Central Asia. Economic Policy and Development Challenges, London: The School of 
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the largest agricultural power in the region, cotton is a very 
marginal part of its economy. In 2008, Astana only exported 
93,000 tonnes of cotton.36 Uzbekistan, however, is the third 
largest producer and second largest exporter in the world. Over 
80% of Russian cotton imports come from Uzbekistan.37 Official 
figures for 2007 show that 3.5 million tonnes of cottonseed 
were produced and 1.2 million tonnes of cotton hair. However, 
the figures put forward by foreign organisations are much lower. 
Land  degradation  has  contributed  to  declining  production 
and  falling  cotton  quality,  deemed  inferior  to  that  of  many 
other producing countries. Tajikistan, the world’s 13th largest 
producer and 9th largest exporter, has meanwhile increased its 
production, reaching 558,000 tonnes in 2004.38 It appears to 
have declined again in recent years to 418,000 tonnes in 2007.39 
The series of bad harvests was further aggravated in 2008, when 
production declined to 350,000 tonnes, representing only 64% 
of the amount forecasted.40
Turkmenistan is also among the ten largest producers in the 
world  but,  given  its  wealth  in  oil,  cotton  represents  only  a 
small share of GDP. In addition, cotton’s export earnings have 
continued to fall. Turkmenistan reported earning $791 million 
in 1995, $332 million in 1996, and only $84 million in 2005.41 
Steps were then taken to develop on-site treatment in order 
to be able to sell a finished product at higher prices. Between 
1995 and 2000, the share of treated cotton in the republic 
rose from 3% to 35%. This development of the textile industry 
is not enough to bridge the shortfall in currencies linked to 
the  decline  in  production  as  95%  of  Turkmenistan’s  textile 
production is exported. As in Uzbekistan, the degradation of 
soil quality, deterioration of irrigation, a lack of fertiliser and 
de-mechanisation  have  depressed  production.42  Previously 
estimated at 2 tonnes per hectare, it dropped to 1.5 tonnes per 
hectare in 2001-2002. Production has declined steadily since, 
reaching in 2005, the worrying figure of about 715,000 tonnes, 
despite the government’s claim that production exceeded 3 
million tonnes. The decline was exacerbated by the irrational 
decisions of President Saparmurat Niyazov, who imposed in 
2003 a specific date for planting even if the weather did not 
permit it, leading to the loss of a large portion of inputs and 
forcing farmers to replant two or three times. According to 
official figures, 800,000 hectares were devoted to cotton in 
2004, but the actual area was probably beyond one million 
hectares.43  Operating  surfaces  are  indeed  minimised  in  the 
official  statistics,  allowing  local  governors  to  declare  higher 
rates of production per hectare.
Alongside the issue of privatisation of land, the Central Asian 
states have to face a fundamental contradiction. They can give 
preference  to  cotton,  which  guarantees  substantial  foreign 
exchange earnings for the state, or choose to develop vegetable 
and grain production for the sake of food self-sufficiency. The 
issue of food safety concerns all states in the region and has 
now  become  a  particularly  sensitive  political  issue.  Indeed, 
the climate risks (cold winters, excessive rainfall, and drought 
during the growing season) that make harvests unpredictable, 
combined with the rising prices of basic foods, have a direct 
impact on Central Asian populations, especially in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The UN Food Programme announced in 2009 that 
2.2 million Tajik citizens would be in a situation of food insecurity 
(34% of the rural population and 37% of urban population), 
and that some 800,000 were directly threatened by famine.44 
In Kyrgyzstan, the number of people subject to food insecurity 
is around one million. The difficulty of states achieving food 
self-sufficiency requires them to rely heavily on grain imports, 
particularly  on  Kazakhstan,  which  however decided  in  2008 
to stop its exports to ensure the domestic market.45 The most 
affected regions in Tajikistan are the traditionally poor ones 
(the Khatlon region and Pamir) but also, paradoxically, Sogd in 
the north, including the regional capital of Khujand, which was 
historically one of the richest in the country.
It is therefore necessary to strike a balance between cotton 
acreage and those devoted to feeding the people. According 
to  the  UN  World  Food  Programme,  Tajikistan  needs  1.2 
million tonnes of grain per year but, in the best-case scenario, 
produces just over half this and is therefore largely dependent 
on  humanitarian  aid  and  grain  imports.46  In  Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, no reliable figures are available but cases of 
quasi-famine  in  some  provinces  were  confirmed.  In  all  the 
Central Asian states except Kazakhstan, the health of younger 
generations is impacted by malnutrition. Uzbekistan, with an 
annual grain production of 5 million tonnes, is expected to be 
self-sufficient  and  even  exported  some  of  its  production  (it 
is the 20th largest exporter in the world). However, shortages 
of wheat have increased in recent years, particularly in 2008, 
when Astana agreed to a moratorium on exports. The price of 
bread has soared throughout Uzbekistan and flour has been 
unavailable in Khorezm and Karakalpakstan. Trafficking of wheat 
to the Kazakh-Uzbek border has taken on an unprecedented 
scale. On the Kazak side, the Dostyk and Zhartyboe districts 
in  the  Saryagash  region  are  known  for  their  traffic  in  flour 
towards Tashkent, challenging the official Uzbek stance of self-
sufficiency.
Should cotton then be considered a major contributor to the 
food crisis affecting Central Asia? A Mercy Corps study shows 
that  malnutrition  is  mainly  concentrated  in  cotton  growing 
areas.47 As an essential source of foreign exchange, cotton is 
at the heart of the corruption of the state apparatus and the 
lack of wealth redistribution to the people. The ruling circles 
are  enriched  much  faster  through  their  control  of  cotton 
exports than by the profits obtained from vegetable or grain 
production,  which  are  minimal  and  difficult  to  privately 
control.  Some  international  organisations  or  NGOs  like  the 
International  Crisis  Group  argue  therefore  for  a  reduction 
in cotton production in favour of producing more grain and 
vegetables. To some experts, this position is excessive; more 
should be done to reform the agricultural sector, upstream and 
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riches of cotton, rather than replacing it with other products 
that would continue to finance the system of coercion imposed 
by states on their rural populations.48
2. Political, Economic and Social Stakes in 
the Agrarian Sector
Upstream: The Exploitation of Farmers
The situation of farmers differs in each Central Asian republic. In 
the most authoritarian states such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Tajikistan, farmers located at the very beginning of supply 
chain benefit very little from their work, the fruits of which 
are absorbed by the state structure. Production is planned, 
purchase prices are ridiculous and coercion is present at all 
levels of the system. In Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, farmers are 
more autonomous, selling their products at the world market 
price, but are prisoners to its fluctuations. 
In  Turkmenistan,  the  authoritarian  regime  especially  leaves 
little  obvious  choice  to  farmers.  The  declines  in  production 
experienced  by  the  country  have  increased  pressure  on 
governors who, in turn, exert considerable pressure on farmers 
to ensure that they meet production quotas. Farmers derive little 
or no profit from their crops, but receive some compensation 
from  the  national  company  Turkmenpagta,  which  provides 
free inputs. In Uzbekistan, cotton is less profitable than other 
crops, but this varies by region.49 Prices charged by the state 
assume that farmers produce at least 2.7 tonnes of seed cotton 
per  hectare,  while  production  averaged  just  over  2  tonnes 
in  the  mid-2000s.50  The  2002  reform,  intended  to  liberalise 
state orders, changed little in practice. Under pressure from 
the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  Uzbek  government 
has  begun  to  align  its  purchase  price  to  the  world  market, 
although these efforts remain modest. Further in a number of 
areas, particularly the provinces of Samarkand and Tashkent, 
the state offset the increased purchase price of a tonne of 
cotton by tripling property taxes. Moreover, farmers have little 
control over their earnings. Banks routinely confiscate money 
paid by state and only pay fixed cash sums for the purchase 
of equipment or inputs, but not salaries or even less profits. 
When world cotton prices fell as they did in 2004-2005, Uzbek 
farmers received only 80% of the official price promised by 
the state. The money is always paid late and not adjusted for 
inflation. In some cases, the Uzbek farmers are paid in kind 
with oil or flour.
In  Tajikistan,  although  the  situation  is  theoretically  more 
liberalised, an unwritten rule requires farmers to grow cotton 
on more than 80% of their plots of land. Many farmers raising 
other crops have stood accused of breach of contract. A decree 
adopted  in  2008,  however,  guarantees  farmers  the  right  to 
choose  their  crops  and  it  appears  that  cotton  has  dropped 
slightly  below  the  70%  level.51  As  in  Uzbekistan,  laws  are 
established to benefit the cotton magnates, to the detriment 
of  individual  farmers.  Amendments  to  the  2008  land  code 
confirm the complicity of senior officials and landowners, like 
R. Umarov, one of the largest landowners in the country, since 
they can take back land from impoverished farmers, who are 
obligated to cede them to clear their debts. Each year, the Tajik 
state establishes a production plan that, although presented as 
a forecast or recommendation, is in practice mandatory. Poor 
storage and transportation conditions lead to deterioration in 
the quality of seed cotton, wherein it loses between 20% and 
25% of its value at harvest. According to the World Bank, higher 
cotton prices between 1999 and 2003 gave no advantage to 
Tajik farmers. Their incomes from cotton were indeed very low. 
In 2004, the average salary of a cotton farmer was $7 per month 
while those who produced anything other than cotton earned 
eight to 13 times more.52 The main cotton-producing area in 
Tajikistan, Khatlon, with 30% of the population, has an extreme, 
50% poverty rate.53 A witness reported that in 2008, on a farm 
in Yavan comprising of 23 families, the harvest, however good, 
would have yielded a total of $3,000.54 While officially, farmers 
receive a salary, many of them are paid in kind, with items such 
as cotton stalks that can be used for fuel.55
The  work  of  children  and  adolescents  in  the  cotton  fields, 
especially during the harvest, is one of the biggest controversies 
in the Central Asian agricultural sector, especially Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Each year in Uzbekistan, about 
450,000 children are forced to leave school and participate in 
the cotton harvest.56 Recruitment is compulsory for children 
between the ages of 10 and 15 years; they are employed in 
the fields between 51 and 63 days per year without weekend 
breaks.57 The testimonies of several farmers denounced the use 
of very young children. A child is supposed to pick up to 80 kilos 
of cotton per day, but many of them cannot harvest even 40 
kilograms. About 3 cents is paid per harvested kilogram, thus 
those who manage to collect the 80 kilograms earn between 
$2.50  and  $3  a  day.58  Officially,  the  Uzbek  regime  explicitly 
prohibited child labour in 2008. However, it is unlikely that this 
law is enforced since without the virtually free work of children 
and adolescents, the harvest could not be completed and the 
state would not be able to pocket the profits.
In these three states, students are also subject to high pressures. 
They generally cannot refuse to participate in the harvest under 
penalty of being expelled from university, unless they pay for 
a  false  medical  certificate,  which  gives  rise  to  considerable 
corruption. According to several reports, some students buy 
kilos of cotton from neighbouring farmers to avoid sanctions 
and are therefore in debt when they leave the fields. They are 
paid such a trifling; a large part of their official salaries goes 
to room and board, while they are housed in rustic conditions 
and fed in a meagre manner. Another moral issue is related 
to the displacement of populations, widely practiced during 
the Soviet regime, which continues today in some republics. 
Cotton and, more generally, farming, actually give rise to forced 
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people were sent from the south to the north near the Aral 
Sea  to  work  in  the  fields.  The  mass  migration  of  working-
age men from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to Russia inevitably 
leads to growth in the number of women and children in the 
fields. Thus, in the cotton-growing areas of Tajikistan, women 
represent between 85% and 90% of the workforce.59 In the 
province of Khatlon, 70% of women would be willing to pick 
cotton stalks after the harvest for use as fuel.
Finally, the disappearance of the Soviet system led to a rapid 
de-mechanisation of the agricultural sector, which aggravates 
human exploitation. Rising fuel prices, a lack of spare parts 
and difficulty repairing Soviet tools do not foster technological 
development.  In  Turkmenistan,  farmers  are  obliged  to  use 
machinery  from  the  state  firm  Türkmenobahizmat,  but  the 
prices for its technical assistance are exorbitant. The Turkmen 
government is spending huge sums to buy foreign equipment—
the procurement of which generates many kickbacks—but it 
can hardly be used due to a lack of technological knowledge, 
spare parts or money for upkeep. There are only about five 
machines to harvest cotton in each province that are actually 
operational.60 Moreover, liberalisation of input prices makes 
the  use  of  machines  more  expensive,  which  encourages 
harvesting by hand. These countries are increasingly affected by 
unemployment, and deliberate de-mechanisation ensures the 
use of the largest possible number of individuals, thus reducing 
risks of social tension. Manual harvesting remains therefore 
largely  favoured:  in  Uzbekistan,  the  share  of  mechanised 
harvest fell to 57% in 1990, 35% in 1993, and is probably less 
than 20% today.61
In border areas, many farmers try to circumvent state obligations 
through smuggling. Uzbek farmers, for example, can sell their 
cotton in Kyrgyzstan for five times the price at home. In 2003, 
the purchase price of a tonne of cotton in Uzbekistan was $50 
to $80, while the price ranged between $250 and $320 on 
the Kyrgyz market. Considerable traffic is also noted along the 
Turkmen-Uzbek border, where the Uzbek farmers try to sell to 
their neighbours a portion of their output in exchange for fuel. 
This trade helps the Turkmen farmers and local authorities, 
under pressure by the state planification. During the harvest 
season, Uzbek farmers also seek to move towards the border of 
Kazakhstan to work for much more consistent wages. Therefore 
the failure of the Uzbek government to properly pay its farmers 
fuels trafficking of any type. Finally, Central Asian agriculture 
poses many environmental problems: the poor condition of 
irrigation structures, which have particularly high loss rates; 
overuse of water by farmers; difficulty in demanding payment 
for its use, given the low rural standard of living; high salinity 
(according to the World Bank, over 60% of irrigated cropland 
in Central Asia is affected by the problem of salinisation);62 and 
the degradation of soil quality and its impact on public health.
Downstream: The Corruption of State and 
Intermediary Companies
Although profits from cotton production are expected to help 
finance other parts of the economy, they actually substantially 
divert funds, amputating the expected benefits. Cotton receives 
particularly bad press and is perceived by the population as an 
essential element of political and economic elite corruption.
In  Uzbekistan,  most  cotton  is  sold  to  the  state-controlled 
company Uzpakhtasanoat, which then sells it to import and 
export  enterprises  approved  by  the  government.  Officially 
private, these companies are under the thumb of the ruling 
clans, especially the SNB. Foreign buyers are forced to enter 
into  agreements  with  approved  national  companies,  which 
generally require a prepayment of 30% to 80% of the amount, 
advanced by foreign banks operating in Tashkent like Crédit 
Suisse,  Société  Générale  and  ABN-AMRO.  A  large  majority 
of private cotton exporters are actually members of a clan in 
power and manage their business through offshore companies 
registered in the British Virgin Islands and Cyprus. They give 
themselves the highest quality cotton, leaving the inferior quality 
materials to Uzpakhtasanoat. Although a portion of revenue is 
supposed to be redistributed to the agricultural sector via three 
state  banks—Pakhtabank,  Ghallabank  and  Zaminbank—this 
redistribution could not be more opaque. According to the ICG, 
only 10% to 15% of revenues earned through the sale of cotton 
return to the domestic agricultural sector.63
The  corruption  of  political  elites  seems  equally  apparent 
in  Tajikistan.  District  governors  negotiate  directly  with 
potential buyers and force farmers to grow cotton. In some 
cases, the governor even has direct financial interests in the 
local  treatment  plants.  The  country  is  also  affected  by  the 
phenomenon of the so-called ‘future companies’. In the mid-
1990s,  when  the  government  could  no  longer  finance  the 
cotton sector, it appealed to middle market companies, which, 
with backing from foreign lenders, provided loans for necessary 
inputs in exchange for a certain quantity of cotton at the end of 
the harvest. Tajik farmers thus find themselves caught in a trap 
from which they find it very difficult to escape, as the interest 
rate is between 10% and 20%. Many fail to repay the debt they 
have incurred, and are therefore forced to borrow again to 
ensure the next harvest.
In 2008, these debts exceeded $500 million.64 Some of these 
companies are closely linked to ruling political circles and have 
managed to impose their rules in most producing regions. In the 
south, they are in a monopolistic situation and with the support 
of local government, have forced their potential competitors 
to withdraw. Tarnished by scandals, the Tajik government was 
forced by the international community to address the problem 
of ‘future companies’. To put an end to these intermediaries, 
it has asked banks to issue loans directly to farmers, with the 
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However, banks have received this money at an annual interest 
rate of 12% and in turn lend it to farmers at rates ranging from 
14 to 22%.66 This new system has raised many controversies. 
Only one-third of farmers could meet their debts, according to 
official sources from the Ministry of Finance, while two banks, 
Agroinvestbank and Orion Bank, said they were unable to repay 
loans.67
Recommendations
It is difficult for the EU to influence the development of Central 
Asian agriculture for several reasons. First, many factors (the 
speed of reform of private property and the function of central 
and  local  governments)  fall  within  the  domestic  political 
realm and interference there would be unwelcome, especially 
as  agriculture,  particularly  cotton,  is  often  in  the  hands  of 
presidential families or powerful clans. Secondly, because the 
incentives for a more visible commitment of the EU in this 
area belong mainly to the private sector, states cannot impose 
political objectives that run counter to the market economy. 
However, the EU does have several levers of influence at its 
disposal.
Negative Incentives
In  2008,  after  repeated  action  from  human  rights  groups 
against forced child labour in cotton harvesting in Uzbekistan, 
the largest British supermarket chain, TESCO, declared that it 
would henceforth refuse to sell Uzbek cotton, a stand backed 
up by other large textiles consumers such as Wal-Mart, Hennes 
& Mauritz, JC Penney, and Marks & Spencer.68 Other companies 
have refused the boycott, including the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee (ICAC). The refusal to buy Uzbek cotton 
has forced authorities to agree to discuss this topic and to pass 
a law prohibiting  the exploitation of children in this sector. 
The pressures have therefore, in principle, borne fruit, even if 
enforcement will be very difficult to implement.
-  Consider  similar  measures  against  cotton  from  Tajikistan 
and  Turkmenistan,  where  children  are  also  exploited; 
-  Discuss  with  Russia,  the  main  buyer  of  Uzbek  cotton,  the 
proposition that they should invite Russian importing companies 
to join the boycott; and
- Consider the possible exclusion of Uzbek cotton from the EU’s 
concessions under the Generalised System of Preferences.
Positive Incentives for the Private Sector
The  EU  cannot  determine  the  economic  establishment  of 
European  companies  in  the  agricultural  sector.  However, 
European firms have been successful in many areas that could 
help the development of the Central Asian agriculture. The 
high cost of European services for Central Asian states could 
be compensated by implementing mechanisms like special tax 
reductions, advantageous bank loans and legal aid in setting up 
business.
- Set up an EU expert panel charged with listing the agriculture 
sectors that could benefit from the EU’s possible aid mechanisms, 
including: the promotion of renewable energies for agriculture, 
like solar panels; the implementation of sustainable irrigation 
through a run-off system; and the sale of seeds that can grow 
in dry lands with limited irrigation and of natural, chemical-free 
fertilisers.
Focusing Development Programmes on the Agricultural 
Sector
The  EU  needs  to  prioritise  its  commitments  in  the  Central 
Asian agricultural sector: it is still the livelihood for half of the 
population and therefore cannot be considered secondary in 
the prospects of development and the fight against poverty, 
which is predominantly rural.
- Fight against malnutrition of children in rural areas through 
specific  programmes  of  cooperation  with  local  health 
authorities;
-  Propose  to  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development (EBRD), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the World Bank the development of the agrarian banking sector 
in such a way as to fight against the excesses of intermediary 
corporations; require large international banking structures to 
develop partnerships with local banks to offer banking products 
to farmers; promote the concept of micro-credit as practiced 
by  the  Aga  Khan  Foundation;  and  for  individual  or  family 
development projects, offer a range of modest banking products 
that avoid debt traps and limit government corruption;
- Focus over the long term on food safety issues. Three major 
areas appear to be central: develop grain cooperation between 
Central  Asian  states  by  inviting  Kazakhstan  to  become  a 
leader in the regional cereal market; finance storage facilities 
and granaries that secure supply during winter months and 
reduce  losses  due  to  poor  packaging  during  transport  and 
storage; develop livestock and thus access to meat products by 
promoting fodder for this sector, which is now neglected even 
as it is vital to recovery;
- Assist in the conversion of the textile industry in Central Asia; 
only  the  sale  of  already  treated  finished  products,  not  raw 
cotton, could increase revenue from the commodity and slow 
de-industrialisation. In Turkmenistan, the sector is in the hands 
of Turkish businessmen close to the President and hence does 
not seem open to European companies, but Uzbek and Tajik 
authorities  have  requested  international  cooperation  in  this 
field.
Bilateral Negotiations
- Establish an EU-Kazakhstan committee to help the country 
reform its grain sector in the areas of product certification and 
traceability;12  EUCAM Working Paper No. 6
-  Make  an  issue  of  the  transparency  of  state  corporations 
purchasing cotton to farmers as one of the main criteria for 
good governance in order to put pressure on all five Central 
Asian regimes.
In the Framework of the EU Education Initiative
Many issues related to improving the quality of life in rural 
areas obviously depend on the goodwill of governments, but 
also on the ability of the players themselves—the farmers—
to manage their business in an environmentally sustainable 
manner for their own quality of life. China has already started 
to invest in this sector by establishing partnerships between 
the Agricultural University of Almaty and the one in Urumqi; 
cooperation between Russia and Central Asia also exists in this 
area.
- Develop cooperation with Central Asian agricultural academies 
of higher education. Some EU countries—like France, Spain and 
Poland—have vast experience in agriculture and have reformed 
their specialised education system; their experiences could be 
exported to Central Asia through joint projects like student and 
teacher exchanges, help with professional training and changes 
in the curriculum.
Conclusion 
Although  the  EU  is  not  a  major  player  in  Central  Asian 
agriculture, the sector remains a key factor for the stabilisation 
of the region. The fight against poverty will largely hinge on 
improving the working and living conditions of a still largely 
rural population which are sometimes close to international 
legal standards for human exploitation. Slowing the cycle of 
de-industrialisation  and  over-specialisation  in  raw  materials 
is directly linked to opportunities to develop textile and food-
processing enterprises in the economies of Central Asia. The 
objective of food security calls for international support for grain 
and vegetable production as well as storage and distribution 
infrastructure, which have always been a weak link in Soviet 
and  post-Soviet  economies.  Finally,  the  extreme  corruption 
of the state apparatus related to agriculture—cotton export 
networks, mafia banking structures and control by the clans 
in power of the prices for inputs and machinery—exacerbates 
feelings  of  injustice  and  undermines  the  state  legitimacy, 
which play into the hands of Islamist movements that call into 
question the social order in Central Asia.
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